Demokratische Repräsentation im Parteienstaat by Emanuel V. Towfigh
MAX PLANCK SOCIETY
Preprints of the
Max Planck Institute for
Research on Collective Goods
Bonn 2011/16
Old Weimar meets New  
Political Economy:  
Democratic Representation 
in the Party State
Emanuel TowfighPreprints of the 
Max Planck Institute 
for Research on Collective Goods  Bonn 2011/16
Old Weimar meets New Political Economy:
Democratic Representation in the Party State
Emanuel Towfigh
July 2011
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn 
http://www.coll.mpg.deOld Weimar meets New Political Economy: 
Democratic Representation in the Party State  
Emanuel Towfigh* 
 
One of the prominent questions surrounding Weimar Theory of the State was that of the sig-
nificance and influence of the political parties within the state. From the perspective of con-
stitutional law, parties were as undesirable as they were an “inescapable”
1 fact of modern 
statehood. They appeared to be an absolutely necessary consequence of the emancipation of 
all classes and social strata: legitimation of state rule was no longer conceivable merely as a 
natural rule from above; on the other hand, there was no longer a unified bourgeoisie, and it 
thus seemed impossible for the political whole to be represented by people who felt beholden 
exclusively to the common weal. The homogeneous “people” had become a heterogeneous 
“mass”. The parties seemed to be a necessity, on the one hand, for active citizens to articulate 
themselves in the political system and, on the other hand, for state unity not to be torn apart 
by the power of a plurality of interests leaning in many different directions. Parties could 
therefore be conceived of as a prerequisite for state organisation: the idea of the “party state” 
was born. One important protagonist in the discussion on the status of parties within the state 
structure was the constitutional legal scholar Gerhard Leibholz (1901 – 1982).
2 In Weimar 
times, he was the most prominent representative of party state theory (Parteienstaatslehre), 
and as someone who “had somehow fallen between the eras”,
3 he also actively shaped the 
party state of the Bonn Republic for over twenty years (1951 – 1971), as a judge at the Feder-
al Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), by significantly influencing legislation 
on parliamentary, party and electoral law. His persona was therefore a particularly important 
bridging link between the Weimar Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, and even 
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today, his theses are highly topical: “Beyond all eras, Gerhard Leibholz stands for the great 
tradition of German constitutional theory.”
4 
This topicality manifests itself in his analysis of the difficulties, exacerbated by the parties, of 
a political representation in the democratic system. For Leibholz, the only valid dimension of 
the term representation is one that is geared towards representing, or “mirroring” the people 
in parliament (much in the sense that a randomly drawn sample in empirical research is said 
to represent the population it was drawn from); for him, the agency aspect (in the sense that 
someone is legally represented by proxy) is secondary. In the modern mass state, according to 
him, the parliament (i.e., the people’s representation) can no longer be understood as reflect-
ing the people: representation is impossible. However, this also means that the connection 
between the people’s representatives and the people’s will has been severed, the normative 
commitment to the common weal goes nowhere, and this lack of representation creates a le-
gitimation deficit. The parties as Leibholz sees and describes them, and which, for the most 
part, continue to survive until this day, reinforce this effect dramatically by way of their par-
tiality. His party state doctrine hence aims at allowing the institutions representing the people 
to become in a certain sense identical with the people by way of newly understood parties, so 
that it becomes an inescapable condition — normatively as well as factually — that only such 
decisions can be made that lie in the interest of the people.   
This fundamental issue in particular, namely the question of representation mechanisms in a 
party democracy, is still in effect in the Federal Republic of today, with its system of demo-
cratic competition; with conditions becoming ever more complex, e.g., in the case of the to-
day’s state in the multi-level system, it has even continued to grow. Even if the solutions 
proffered by Leibholz have not proved fruitful, it does seem a worthwhile task to take up his 
specific analysis once again. In doing this, we wish to connect Leibholz’ findings, which he 
made on his path towards a clearer understanding of representation, with newer theoretical 
approaches, such as those stemming from Public Choice Theory. However, the current study 
asks more questions than it is capable of offering answers; this can be interpreted as a further 
indication of just how complex and topical the problem identified by Leibholz is — there is 
no simple solution. 
A.  The development of Leibholz’ party state theory  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe in full detail Leibholz’ party state doctrine and 
the many critical responses to it, and this has already been accomplished in admirable fash-
ion.
5 It should therefore suffice to provide just a basic outline, inasmuch as this is necessary 
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for our argument. In doing this, I primarily interpret Leibholz’ model, and his Weimar papers 
in particular, as an attempt to give the constitution — rather than the de facto domination by 
the parties — primacy over the democratic state, and as an attempt to subject the parties to a 
strict, constitutional regime, curbing their power. Paraphrasing one of Bertolt Brecht’s 
Keuner stories,
6 we could refer to Leibholz as being severely opposed to parties: he did not 
(only) wish to abolish them, but rather wanted other parties.  
I.  Basics of party state doctrine 
Leibholz developed his party state doctrine in three steps (and over a period of more than 30 
years),
7 which can be paraphrased as follows. Departing from a poignantly phrased analysis 
(first, descriptive), he first ascertained that – compared to the ideal of representative democ-
racy in the 19th century – there were significant departures in the political reality, as well as 
severe changes in the status of parliamentarians, in parliamentary debates and in the behavior 
of parties, all of which led him to conclude that the essence of the political party in the mod-
ern state had changed. Against this backdrop, and influenced by other contemporaries such as 
Carl Schmitt and his teacher Heinrich Triepel (both of whom were affiliates of the “Humani-
ties faction” in the so-called Weimar Methodenstreit), he developed a theory (second, a mod-
el resembling a theory) that the classical, liberal representative systems were no longer capa-
ble of obtaining the necessary legitimation for a state;
8 according to him, they had become a 
mere cliché. From these theoretical deliberations, Leibholz (third, normative) deduced that 
they could be replaced by the “mass-democratic party state” alone, which was antagonistic to 
representative parliamentarianism: the masses would be activated by the parties, operate 
within them and hence be bound to the state. In the triangle of populace, parties and state, the 
parties are given a constitutive part, and without “the interposition of these organisations, the 
people would today be an amorphous mass, politically powerless and helplessly vegetating to 
and fro”.
9 All politically active citizens would have to organize in such parties, and those who 
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7   G. Leibholz, Repräsentation und der Gestaltwandel der Demokratie im 20. Jahrhundert, 3rd ed., Berlin, 
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1950, pp. 194 ff., and Parteienstaat und Repräsentative Demokratie, DVBl. 1951, pp. 1 ff. 
8   Leibholz, Wahlrechtsreform (fn. 1), p. 159 (160 ff. passim). 
9   Leibholz, Parteienstaat (fn. 7), p. 3. 4 
did not commit to a party would “forfeit” their right to participate in the political debate.
10 In 
his system, the parties no longer represent the electorate, but become identical with it;
11 this 
is why Leibholz sees his party state as a variant of plebiscitary democracy. However, the par-
ties in Leibholz’ world have no more in common with our modern parties than the name. A 
constant plebiscite, as it were, they become totally absorbed in the state. In Leibholz’ view, 
the parliament merely registers what has been decided by the parties; the Member of Parlia-
ment is hence “an exponent of his party”.
12 From these normative reflections, Leibholz drew 
his own concrete legal-policy conclusions: amongst these are the imperative mandate — for 
parliamentarians have to be bound to the quasi-plebiscitary will of the people, as it is ex-
pressed in the parties; further, the democratic inner constitution of the parties — for only 
through this can we be sure that the true will of the people is brought to bear in the parties, 
allowing for an identity of the rulers and the ruled alike; and finally, the status of the parties 
as a constitutional organ, for political parties are much more important now than elections, 
with regard to forming a political will that hence legitimizes the state (Leibholz ultimately 
considers elections dispensable). Under the German Constitution (Grundgesetz, GG), he al-
tered these assumptions in view of Article 38 GG, which in his opinion ran counter to the 
system, but he also perceived a tension between Articles 21 GG and 38 GG and was reluctant 
to adjust this tension, which he claimed went back merely to an anachronistic perception of 
representation in the constitution: “the fundamentals of representative parliamentarianism, as 
they are expressed in Art. 38 and in the following clauses, can today only be seen as rear-
guard action, as they fulfill the function of warding off the most extreme consequences of the 
modern party state. […] A view that would give representative parliamentarianism more im-
pact and would attempt to use it in order to alleviate the dangers of the party state would 
overlook the fact that the modern party state can no longer be corrected by means of repre-
sentative parliamentarianism.”
13 
This phrase also shows that Leibholz, even in later years, did not in the least have the uninter-
ruptedly positive relationship with parties that he was said to have. Rather, his Partei-
enstaatslehre can be understood, from today’s perspective, as an attempt to master the prob-
lem of democratic legitimation of the mass state. At the core of his thinking lies the concept 
of representation of the people in the democratic state, a concept Leibholz perceived as being 
central to legitimation.
14 Although his method can be contested with regard to certain indi-
vidual aspects, he had recognized that neither parliamentarians nor parties (to which the MPs 
were not legally bound, although they were bound in other ways) were capable of represent-
ing the people: the parliamentarians were incapable because of their link to the parties, and 
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the parties were incapable because they were floating freely and without any linkage in the 
political space.
15 Representation was to him an insincere and unstable construction. For 
Leibholz, the decisive part of the legitimating chain was missing, with which the people 
would be able to bind the parliament – and hence the state – to itself. He therefore perceived 
the one element that fundamentally legitimized democracy as vanishing.
16 His theory was not 
anti-democratic, as some would have it;
17 rather, it is an attempt to secure the people’s influ-
ence on the state. If Members of Parliament, for logistical or organizational reasons, were no 
longer irreversibly bound to the people, but instead to their parties, then the parties had to be 
bound to the people. From this, Leibholz postulated that only a citizen who was affiliated 
with a party was capable of acting politically, i.e., a politically active citizen or Aktivbürger. 
The populace (in the sense of Aktivbürger) and the government (i.e., the leadership as deter-
mined by the political parties) become “identical”, in Leibholz’ view, and from the demand 
for a democratic inner organization of the parties one might deduce that it is imperative for 
their parliamentarians be bound to party decisions; parliament would hence merely have a 
function of registering the will of the people, as it has become distilled in the parties. Not the 
parliamentarian is legitimized, but rather the party. In view of the fact that the people were 
hardly being represented, all these instruments were conceived as an institutional safeguard-
ing the efficiency of the people’s will in the state, and in fact they were established to serve 
the protection of democracy; they were intended as the opposite of anti-democratic. 
II.  Criticism of the Party state doctrine  
Leibholz’ Party State Doctrine, or Parteienstaatslehre — which during the Weimar Republic 
was little more than a thesis, later becoming a doctrine in the Federal Republic and finally 
turning into his trademark
18 — received much criticism in the fields of political science and 
constitutional theory, both in the Weimar Republic and in the Federal Republic of Germa-
ny.
19 
On the one hand, there was a methodological criticism of his phenomenological reconstruc-
tion of constitutional reality. In the Weimar years, Arnold Köttgen,
20 Hans Julius Wolff
21 and 
Hans Nawiasky
22 were at the fore of those who criticized the combination of both humanities-
related and legal definitions of the term representation. The apparent Wesensgesetze, or es-
sential characteristics, of representation were, in their view, not only “anything but evident”
23 
                                        
15   Leibholz, Repräsentation (fn.7), pp. 103 f. 
16   Hecker, Parteienstaatslehre (fn. 5), pp. 289 ff. 
17   Kaiser, Leibholz (fn. 2), p. 231; Hecker, Parteienstaatslehre (fn. 5), p. 299. 
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enstaatslehre (fn. 5), pp. 287 ff. 
20   AöR 19 (1930), pp. 290 ff. 
21   Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 24 (1930), pp. 392 ff. 
22   Leipziger Zeitschrift für deutsches Recht 26 (1932), pp. 130 f. 
23   H. J. Wolff, Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 24 (1930), p. 392 (397). 6 
and in need of proof, but they were of an intuitive nature, i.e., ultimately beyond any inter-
subjective and empirical examination. Further, “positive law is not bound by any possible 
Wesensgesetze”.
24 Hasso Hofmann took up this critique much later by coining the accurate 
and conciliatory phrase that Parteienstaatslehre drew “conclusions at the theoretical level of 
political sociology, and not necessarily at the level of concrete constitutional law”.
25 In addi-
tion, Hofmann sees the depiction of constitutional reality as based on an ahistorically idealiz-
ing perspective of history, which in itself is also vulnerable: for 19
th-century parliamentarian-
ism had also seen pluralism of interests (the societal groups and classes were not as homoge-
neous as Leibholz made them out to be), and early forms of the mandatory party vote in 
parliament, for instance, were present. Conversely, modern “mass-state” democracy also 
comprises a pronounced personal element. In the political-science arena of the Federal Re-
public, the categorization of modern democracy as a structural type of identity was deemed 
particularly untenable.
26 Further, Leibholz‘ characterization of parties sparked criticism: on 
the one hand, his theory degraded it, instrumentalizing it as “mouthpieces“ of popular will, 
and on the other hand, he revered them as bearers of political will formation. Either way, in 
the later Federal Republic, and in the view of more recent constitutional theory, both view-
points became incompatible with the involvement of the parties in political will formation; 
this involvement constitutes a cornerstone of Article 21 of the Grundgesetz and is based on 
individual decisions of party members. 
Finally, Leibholz’ model of party-state democracy was also subject to much criticism. On the 
one hand, he was accused of being close to a dictatorial one-party regime (although such a 
scenario was precisely what Leibholz strove to avoid);
27 and on the other hand, people 
claimed it displayed disdain for the concept of parties itself, which, these critics maintained, 
would be doomed to failure and would appear to show a severe lack of any veracity. 
B.  The Problem of Representation in the Party state 
As mentioned before, the question of democratic representation lay at the core of Leibholz’ 
reflections, and this is shown by the fact that he kept adjusting and developing his Partei-
enstaatslehre to the new situation under the Grundgesetz during the time of the Bonn Repub-
lic. This was all the more remarkable given that there was competition from another demo-
cratic party-state model that attempted to harmonize Art. 21 and Art. 38 GG. Neither was 
able to alleviate Leibholz’ more basic problem. 
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37. 
27   Leibholz, Parteienstaat (fn. 7), p. 4.  7 
I.  The Party state theory in the federal republic 
In order to show just how topical Leibholz’ reflections surrounding the term representation 
are, we need to elaborate briefly on the criticism of his ideas, and how this criticism devel-
oped and accentuated the alternative model as it is applied in the Federal Republic to this day. 
As Konrad Hesse outlined powerfully in his influential essay on theory of the state in 1958,
28 
Art. 21 GG and Art. 38 GG are not opposites, but instead to be understood as a synthesis. 
Hence, parties perform a central role in forming political will, without being the bearers of 
political will formation. They still remain voluntarily founded associations that perform im-
portant tasks in recruiting the political leadership, which then requires legitimation by a ma-
jority. If they are in government, they are the “link in the legitimation chain between the peo-
ple and the political leadership”,
29 and if they are in opposition, they perform a control func-
tion, assuring that power is not abused. Finally, as mediators of a free and open process of 
political will formation, they bring together political goals in programs, molding them in dis-
course and applying them to the commonwealth. At the center of the political process, how-
ever, is the free parliamentarian who is committed to the public weal, and the stage of his 
political actions is the parliament: “If rational personalities use their freedom properly, i.e., 
rationally, then it may be said of such a [parliamentary] discussion that it has a creative and 
constructive character. It need not fear public scrutiny. On the contrary, with its help, the 
people should participate in the political deliberations of its representatives.”
30 This is the 
way we understand the characteristic essence of parties today, and the image of parties as 
mouthpieces do not fit this picture, today’s understanding seem irreconcilable with Leibholz’ 
party state theory. 
II.  The political reality 
Even a superficial glance at the political reality shows that the picture we have just outlined 
has become an unreal cliché. One may say without exaggeration that, if one wishes to analyze 
closely the political reality today, it is simply not compatible with the constitutional norm of 
Art. 38 GG. Nowadays, the parties dominate elections. With the help of the parliamentary 
groups, the legislation at federal and at land level remains in their hands. Without them, no 
treaty is signed and no budget passed. They are called to control the executive branch, and 
just as they also form the government (recall, for instance, the recent coalition negotiations), 
they play a major role in the election of the Federal President. The parliamentary groups’ size 
                                        
28   Hesse, Parteien (fn. 26), pp. 10 ff. In several elaborations, one can sense how Hesse, usually without 
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29   Hesse, Parteien (fn. 26), p. 21. 
30   Leibholz, Repräsentation (fn. 7), p. 254. 8 
decides how many representatives the Bundestag sends to the supranational parliamentary 
assemblies. At local-authority level, too, the parties’ influence continues to grow, for instance 
if one considers how both state and local parliaments are called to send representatives to 
committees that play a huge part in public life. 
The above paragraph is a forceful example for just how topical Leibholz’ reflections still are 
— for these lines stem, word for word, from his very own pen, namely from a lecture he held 
in 1965 on the occasion of the 40
th anniversary of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative 
Public Law and International Law.
31  Had I not revealed this here, my assumption is that it 
would hardly have been noticed that these words were spoken 45 years ago; indeed, one 
might have asked why this example was not elaborated upon in more colorful detail — the 
election of President Wulff, for instance, which was in no small measure the result of party 
motives, and the so-called Fraktionsdisziplin (in other words, the tacit expectation that the 
parliamentary groups vote as one), which is expected even in the Federal Convention, are not 
the only obvious examples from the more recent past.  
The dominance of the political parties in the political process is undisputed today. It seems 
unnecessary to list the countless voices from science and everyday politics. Bearing in mind 
the continuities of German Constitutional Theory, I would like to limit myself to only one 
quote from Stolleis’ lecture on the Staatsrechtslehrertagung 1985:
32 “The fact itself is unde-
niable. The selection of administrative personnel according to their party affiliation and re-
flecting the relative proportions of parties, and the spoils system are firmly a part of the party 
state in administration and self-administration, as well as in the transitions towards a societal 
power that is being increasingly organized under private law. The parties hold the career lad-
ders, discipline dissenters and reward any successful defense of terrain. This is a matter of 
course in the case of local self-administration, which has for a long time now been firmly 
established by the party state as the bottom level of parliamentarianism.” The system of dem-
ocratic competition, as developed by Hesse, did not work against this development, but in-
stead aided it — however, it never intended to confront this challenge. Rather, the constitu-
tional sanctioning of that model meant that the attempt to tame the parties was given up.  
In his preface to the third edition of his habilitation thesis, Wesen der Repräsentation, 
Leibholz declares “the question of how political will is formed, particularly in a democracy”, 
to be a “crucial problem of political science”; this, in his view, “has been shown by centuries 
of Constitutional Theory history”. If we take this issue as a benchmark, then what ultimately 
distinguishes Leibholz from Hesse is their viewpoint on how the sovereign will becomes a 
reality in the democratic state – and hence their relationship with the idea of representation. 
In Hesse’s Constitutional Theory lecture, the word representation does not even feature. On 
the contrary: citing Joseph Schumpeter, he explicitly expounds on democracy meaning “not 
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44, pp. 7 ff.  9 
dominance of the people, but dominance 'for the people'”;
33 he therefore contrasts what Lin-
coln referred to in his Gettysburg Address as two harmonizing notes in a triad. As late as 
1985, Stolleis deemed it necessary, in his Staatsrechtslehrertagung lecture, to clarify that 
“Leibholz’ distinction of people and people of the party and his dichotomy of representative 
system and party state, which from the beginning was fraught with exaggeration, was out of 
touch with reality, used antiquated philosophical premises and has today become utterly 
problematic. The representative system and the party state are indeed very compatible. […] 
Party demands, moral constraints and constraints of interest are just as normal for the socially 
integrated individual called parliamentarian as the intended legal effects of these constraints 
are null and void.”
34  
In this particular regard, Leibholz’ and Hesse’s perception of, or opinion on, the reality and 
the concomitant views on democratic theory differ from Stolleis’ views. Both men recognized 
that, in the political arena, a (democratic) state was no longer attainable with the classic con-
cept of representation in the sense of an original reflection of popular will; and while 
Leibholz harbored the ambition to replace it with something (namely, his idea of identity), 
Hesse tacitly gave it up, in order to arrive at his moderate synthesis of the constitutional prin-
ciples of Art. 21 and Art. 38 GG. Stolleis, on the other hand, reverted back to cultivating the 
representation myth, envisaging the institutional safeguarding of representation.
35 For him, 
representation is an indispensable fiction that facilitates attributing the decisions of the sover-
eign’s elected political leadership to the sovereign – i.e., the people. For this attribution to be 
legitimate and accepted by the sovereign, the political decision has to be made within a clear 
mandate; here, proportional representation — in the sense of the election of a program — 
serves as the specification of a “framework mandate”. One may speculate that Stolleis has the 
same reasons for suggesting this interpretation as Leibholz had for proffering the principle of 
identity as an alternative: to safeguard democracy, in order to prevent a legitimation deficit, 
and due to a lack of an alternative that, Stolleis’ story told us, not even Leibholz could have 
delivered.  
In comparison with the principle of representation, however, the party-state democracy is 
bound to seem just as untrustworthy as it was for the evaluation based on Leibholz’ identity 
principle. For it does seem implausible that a free mandate, as Stolleis suggested, should be 
content with socially binding party demands and interest constraints existing without being 
legally sanctionable. At any rate, Stolleis appears to be one of the few people who criticised 
Leibholz with regard to his elaborations on the theoretical problem of representation; the rest 
is helpless silence. That, however, is no less surprising, given that the term representation 
remains one of the most enigmatic terms in the realm of political theory.
36 It belongs to the 
                                        
33   Hesse, Parteien (fn. 26),  pp. 19 f.; the emphasis is in the original. 
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oldest problems of statehood — and not merely democratic statehood — and has created en-
tirely new theoretical problems since the abolishment of the monarchy. The Weimar debate 
was unable to solve the question, and to this day it remains one of the unsolved mysteries of 
Constitutional Theory.
37  
C.  The problem of representation in light of new political economy  
The differences between Leibholz, Hesse and Stolleis may be understood as dissent on the 
perception of reality. New Political Economy, and in our case even more precisely approach-
es of Public Choice Theory, provide hence an ideal frame of reference, because they provide 
an analytic toolkit for understanding and evaluating this reality. This should contribute to a 
clearer understanding of the possibilities and limits of the concept of representation. 
Public Choice Theory
38 focuses on conflicts of individual and collective rationality in politi-
cal actors — be they voters, politicians, civil servants, administrations, pressure groups and 
so on. Their cognitive interest is primarily descriptive and analytical. Public Choice Theory 
shall serve here to contrast the normative standard of the constitution — in particular of Art. 
38 GG — with the reality observed. It sees itself predominantly as a further perspective to 
reflect upon politics, the state and administration. It breaks with a more “romantic” under-
standing of politics,
39 which dominated political economics until well into the 1950s. Until 
that time, economists and political scientists gave actors on the political stage a different 
treatment than they gave market actors. In the markets, actors were characterized as being 
interested in maximizing their own self-interest without being in full knowledge of the mar-
ket and its conditions. In politics, on the other hand, the same individuals were regarded as 
being omniscient and exclusively at the service of the public weal. This is the perspective that 
Theory of the State adopted during the Weimar years (albeit without ever reflecting or nam-
ing this), and even today it can be considered an unspoken premise of many concepts of Con-
stitutional Theory. Public Choice Theory rejected this view. On the one hand, it expanded the 
methodological individualism, i.e., the explanation of how systems (for instance, organiza-
tions) function and act, to the political process also; on the other hand, it applied the homo 
oeconomicus model, as a descriptive perspective, to the actors in the political sphere.  
From Economics and Decision Theory, a theoretical framework was developed that could be 
applied to politics. At its core lie the questions about how decisions by individual rational 
actors concerning the community affect the collective welfare, how negative effects can be 
                                        
37   Cf., e.g., C. Möllers, Expressive versus repräsentative Demokratie, in: R. Kreide/A. Niederberger (eds), 
Transnationale Verrechtlichung. Nationale Demokratien im Kontext globaler Politik, Frankfurt/New 
York 2008, pp. 160 ff. 
38   As an introduction to the themes dealt with here, see E. V. Towfigh/N. Petersen, Ökonomische Methoden 
im Recht. Eine Einführung für Juristen, Tübingen 2010, § 6, pp. 133 ff. 
39   Proponents of the emerging Public Choice Theory referred to the classic image political science had of 
the political actors das “romantic”; such actors could be “voters”, “politicians” and “bureaucrats”; cf., 
e.g., G. Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy, Washington 1965. 11 
explained, and the most positive effects possible ensured (Public Choice Theory), and how 
the countless individual interests can best be aggregated to a single collective decision (Social 
Choice Theory). All this is considered bearing in mind that market mechanisms, which lead 
to a disclosure of the market actors’ true preferences, are lacking just as much as the possibil-
ity to harmonize, through individual incentives, the selfish pursuits of the acting individuals 
with higher interests: in privately organized enterprises, this can be achieved by means of 
appropriate contract policies, but in the kind of political system engrained in Public Choice 
Theory, no actor has an incentive to counteract an individual selfish pursuit if it is endanger-
ing the public interest. 
In its basic form, Public Choice Theory meets three presumptions:
40  
–  First, resource allocation is determined by the political process, rather than by an elected 
individual who is “benevolent” or “omniscient”.  
–  Second, it is assumed that the political process is best understood as a strategic interaction 
between the participating groups — primarily voters, politicians and administrations.  
–  Third, every actor strives to maximize his or her individual benefit. For a typical voter, 
this means the general personal benefit, as known from the homo oeconomicus; for the ar-
chetypal politician, the individual benefit, according to theory, is primarily maximized if 
the number of votes is maximized; and finally, the archetypal bureaucrat attempts to in-
crease his administration’s budget as much as possible. 
From these presumptions, Public Choice Theory draws conclusions for rational behavior on 
the part of the political actors, using these conclusions to attempt an explanation for the polit-
ical life and the behavior that can be observed in the political process. Up until now, howev-
er, the role of the parties remains relatively unclear.  
In the following, I wish to use Public Choice Theory to identify three problematic areas that 
are in opposition to the idea of representation. Following the Weimar discussion, I initially 
wish to show that parties can limit parliamentarians’ representational effect in the triangle 
formed by citizens, parliamentarians and party. Leibholz was amongst those who recognized 
this. In a second step, I shall expand this idea, showing that even without parties, i.e., in the 
relation between citizens and parliamentarians, a whole series of results can take effect – re-
sults that are incompatible with the classic concept of representation as a visualization of the 
entire people. In a third step, finally, I focus on the reference point of representation — popu-
lar will — and demonstrate that, ultimately, there cannot be any such thing. 
                                        
40   For the (limited) aims of this contribution, it should suffice to discuss only the central and most basic 
presumptions; many of these presumptions and models have been developed and further refined since the 
inception of Public Choice Theory some six decades ago, or else they have been modified to suit special 
applications. All this, however, cannot be dealt with in depth here. 12 
I.  Representation in the party state 
Leibholz’ intuition that representation in the classic sense is hardly possible in the party state 
appears to be confirmed with the help of this theory. In principle, Public Choice Theory as-
sumes that politicians are eager to maximize the number of votes to attain an office or man-
date. In the party state, it is hardly possible for a parliamentarian to achieve this alone — tell-
ing proof of this can be seen in the fact that there is not a single representative in the German 
Bundestag (and in many other “professional” European parliaments) who is not a member of 
a party. Any politician is therefore bound to a party and to its rationality if he or she contin-
ues to pursue the underlying goal of maximizing votes; if politicians do not subject them-
selves to party reason, the party will give preference to another candidate in that competitive 
game candidates play to gain favor with the parties they need for support – when they, in 
turn, seek support from voters. If, in a system without parties, politicians incentive-
theoretically stick to whatever program might appear to win their favor with the voters, in a 
party state they must also take into account the favor of the party.  
1.  Pursuing particular interests 
It is precisely this aspect that Leibholz views as problematic. Constitutionally — i.e., norma-
tively — voters can follow their own interests; parliamentarians, however, are beholden to 
the public weal.
41  On the other hand, the parties, although privileged by Art. 21 GG because 
of their commitment to the public weal, are free political associations and hence not beholden 
to common welfare. There are indeed substantial incentives to develop policies that are in the 
interest of the majority (although one may question whether this majority can be equated with 
the popular will); however, parties are free to pursue particular interests also. So, if parlia-
mentarians submit to the parties (if, quite literally, they toe the party line), then there is a 
danger that they might effectively (and increasingly) embrace the particular interests promot-
ed by their parties, despite being exclusively bound to the public weal normatively. From an 
empirical perspective, this means that, besides the incentives an individual parliamentarian 
already has (in accordance with Public Choice Theory, and as long as his or her own benefits 
are not maximized while the collective interest is being pursued) to deviate from the norma-
tive commitment to common welfare, further incentives are created by the influence of the 
parties, namely incentives to pursue one’s own particular interests. If a candidate indeed 
strives to advance only common-welfare matters, and if he can only gain a mandate with the 
help of a political party, while pursuing these particular interests, then he can either give up 
hope entirely or else seek success in pursuing both collective and particular interests. As we 
shall see later, this is the case for parties that exclusively serve a particular clientele, rather 
than for the main political parties (Volksparteien, or people’s parties, in German). In this re-
gard, parties may have the effect of detaining parliamentarians from their (normative) func-
tion as representatives of the entire people. In line with Public Choice Theory, the parties 
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bring their own new incentives into the system, thereby changing the behavior of politicians, 
be they candidates or members of parliament. 
2.  Party behavior as a result of the behavior of inner-party actors 
If we take Public Choice Theory seriously, the parties themselves are no monolithic blocks; 
they, too, should be subjected to methodological individualism. In other words, we should 
assume that there is no uniform, overarching party will as such, but that what we assume to 
be party behavior is ultimately the result of the behavior of actors who operate within the par-
ty, following their own individual interests. Various actors are organized within a party: First, 
there is the party base. The party base stands for a particular political orientation, it wishes to 
participate in decisions relating to themes and personnel policy, and it strives to implement a 
political program by convincing fellow citizens to support it — primarily by casting their 
vote for that party in elections, so that the party and its personnel can attain power. Within the 
party base, there are personalities who wish to exert influence directly by taking political re-
sponsibility for actions; frequently these personalities want to make politics their profession. 
In order to get closer to this goal, they ultimately have to undergo the normal proceedings of 
this democratic microcosm. Hence, before they can campaign directly with the voters, they 
must ensure that the party base votes for them; we have sketched above what kind of behav-
ioral incentives that might entail. Finally, there are the party officials, who are ultimately the 
ones who enter the political ring — which is obviously the reason, as Leibholz remarks, why 
those actors with the highest political authority (for instance a head of government) usually 
also aim for the party presidency. Only in this way can they ensure a party’s disciplinary 
function for all members of parliament, so as to be able to implement their program.
42  
3.  Focusing on the median voter  
It seems important to point out that such a system points to the median – to the political cen-
ter ground. It is a truism in politics nowadays that the main political parties can only win 
elections in the political center ground. For political elections, this means that these main par-
ties at least have to campaign for the median voter, i.e. the voter with that set of preferences 
(expressed in his electoral decision) round whom cluster as many voters to the left as to the 
right. For theory, it is irrelevant what the actual voter distribution looks like. If we observe a 
normal distribution, candidates meet at the center of the political spectrum. If our spectrum 
                                        
42   Finally, it should be added that the party list system intensifies the political effects generated by the par-
ties. For this institutional organization means that the party becomes more important for the candidate 
than the voters, because the party can secure a seat even if the candidate is unsuccessful with the voters; 
the party provides him not only with the logistical and financial means to campaign for votes, but it can 
also assure him of a promising position on the party list much the way an insurance works. Yet, only 
such parties can offer a promising place on a party list in electoral system with proportional representa-
tion whose elected representatives convince the electorate. In this text, I can of course only rudimentary 
touch upon these aspects that have been subject to intensive research in political science and political 
economy. 14 
shows a higher number of votes on one particular side, then the median voter moves to the 
right or the left, so that candidates also compete for the median voter to the right or the left of 
the arithmetic center (which can amount to a rather extreme political position within that 
spectrum).
43  
The theoretical explanation of this phenomenon stems from the median voter theorem devel-
oped by Anthony Downs.
44 Downs had been inspired by an article written by the economist 
Harold Hotelling
45. He orients his theory along Schumpeter’s democracy-theoretic concepts, 
according to which candidates (and, more relevant to our question, also political parties) are 
in competition for votes and adjust their programs accordingly, so as to gain as many votes as 
possible.
46 This is the central assumption in Downs’ theory. If we apply these assumptions as 
a basis, then we must conclude that the parties (as well as party-independent candidates) al-
ways cluster around the median voter. If one party or candidate within a party moves slightly 
to the left or right in the political spectrum, then the other party or another candidate can im-
mediately move up and gather those voters, closer to the center, who were left behind by the 
other candidate.  
The median voter effect is amplified by political parties. Extensions to the Downsian model-
indicate that left parties rather field candidates leaning towards their own right wing while 
candidates oriented to the left prevail in right-wing parties. This is because with these candi-
dates a party’s prospects to win median voter votes rises: While voters at the margins will 
vote for the proximal candidate anyways, the battle for the center votes is decisive. The elite 
selection process within parties therefore supports “medianization”. Democratic constitution-
ality within the parties, which Leibholz championed so vehemently, albeit primarily for other 
reasons,
47 leads to the party leadership also having to win over the median voter within the 
party, so that the frightful experience of the Führerprinzip as dogma is eased.
48  
Now, what does this medianization of politics mean for the classic representation model, ac-
cording to which parliamentarians congregate in parliament as representatives of the entire 
people, in order to reproduce the will of the sovereign there and to make it a state reality? On 
the one hand, one might say that the orientation towards the median of political opinion might 
lead to representation of the “true popular will” (which we still have to discuss). Should we 
not be glad about this, given that above we have flagellated the concentration on particular 
                                        
43   It seems important to note that the median voter theorem, giving expression to a strong political intuition, 
can only be proven mathematically with a number of restricting assumptions, among which are a one-
dimensional policy space, a majoritarian two-party   first-past-the-post system, and single-peaked voter 
preferences that in this pure form might only be rarely met in reality. 
44   A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York 1957. 
45   H. Hotelling, Stability in Competition, Economic Journal 39 (1929), 41. 
46   E.g., J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942), New York 1975, pp. 269 ff. (Chapter 
XXII). 
47   Leibholz, Repräsentation (fn. 7), pp. 246 ff. 
48   Cf. A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, Loyalty. Responses to decline in firms, organisations, and states. Cam-
bridge (Mass.) 1970. 15 
interests? The answer is not an easy one as we lack benchmarks within our model framework. 
But the observation that the concentration on the median voter ultimately also prevents repre-
sentation of the entire people, once it becomes a “dictatorship” of the median voter, suggest 
the conclusion that paradoxically not only the pursuit of special interests but also the median-
ization may lead to a decrease in the perceived representativity of a political system. This 
would explain parts of the recent political discourse to the right and the left of the political 
spectrum, according to which a substantial number of citizens (and voters) no longer feels 
represented.  
4. Consequences 
We can safely say that, from the theoretical approach of Public Choice Theory, it is possible 
to find arguments in support of Leibholz’ basic hypothesis, for they show that the parliamen-
tarian in the party state is not only a representative of the (entire) people and helps the will of 
the people to be heard in parliament, but that the parliamentarian is primarily an exponent of 
his party, and that for this reason the idealizing concept of representation of the entire people 
by parliamentarians in the party state is a utopia.  
Interestingly, parties can pose a problem for representation in two different ways: on the one 
hand, they can divert attention from representation of the entire people by embracing particu-
lar interests and imposing them on their representative. On the other hand, however, the ori-
entation towards the median voter might be precisely what could lead to the entire political 
spectrum, in other words the entire people, no longer being represented. Hence, parties distort 
representation, and once again we can see that true representation of popular will is not pos-
sible: either the interests of the center of the electorate are neglected — or else the will of 
voters on the fringe of the spectrum is not taken into account. To look for the solution in a 
personalized form of proportional representation would certainly not suffice, as long as the 
candidates are, de facto, bound by their party membership.
49 
II.  The parliamentarian as a representative of the entire people  
Having analyzed the difficulties representation faces in the party state, we now turn to the 
question whether representation can function without parties, in other words in a relationship 
between citizen and representative. Public Choice Theory can help explain why we often see 
how parliamentarians, in their role as representatives of the entire people, follow their partic-
ular interests rather than pursuing a common-welfare goal, which can be defined in many 
ways; this pursuit of individual goals is frequently justified by seemingly rational arguments. 
And the parties would not even be necessary for this: the political system creates substantial 
incentives that make the pursuit of such individual interests attractive. 
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1.  The influence of particular interests 
A popular example from Public Choice Theory is the view of what societal discourse refers 
to as lobbyism: mechanisms of promoting particular interests. The basic problem is easily 
explained:
50 small groups with particularly pronounced interests profit from the “rational ig-
norance” of the majority of the electorate, as well as from the interest of politicians in max-
imizing votes. At the core of this effect of particular interests lies a specific political decision 
that promises a huge benefit to a small group of voters, but also goes hand in hand with an 
external effect, namely minor costs for a much larger group of other voters. The small group 
of voters has a particular interest in organizing and acting concertedly. From the perspective 
of politicians, the theme dominates the group’s voting decision; if politicians wish to assem-
ble this group of voters behind them, then they have to comply with their demands. On the 
other hand, the larger group of voters, which bears the cost of this decision, is usually not 
interested in the concrete plan, for rational reasons, because the effect on personal wealth lies 
beneath the level of perception, i.e., because the costs of informing oneself about these policy 
decisions and their effects are higher than the benefit of having this information – even if the 
information alone could avert the decision. This is the reason why politicians have strong 
incentives to avail of such special interests, even if that is not in the interest of the common 
welfare (however that may be defined). For they are rewarded by the small group and usually 
not sanctioned by the large one. According to Public Choice Theory, pursuing special inter-
ests is particularly attractive to politicians if the costs are borne by people who do not have a 
vote as a result of a political constellation: for instance, if future generations are burdened — 
this is referred to as “political short-sightedness” — or people from neighboring countries or 
regions in which the respective politician or party is not up for election at that time.
51 The 
problem becomes particularly dramatic if it multiplies because of political logrolling,
52 and 
external effects can arise in groups that are not involved in the election in question. For in-
stance, if a party only lines up in cities A, B and C, external effects could remain unconsid-
ered in D and E.  
One example for this might be the discussion that followed the German Federal election in 
2009, after which value-added tax was reduced from 19 % to 7 % for overnight stays in ho-
tels. The hoteliers had no possibility of raising their prices during the financial crisis. By re-
ducing the VAT rate, a reduction that was rarely passed on to the customer, the hotel industry 
was able to profit from a 12 percentage points increase in one single step; these had to be 
compensated elsewhere, either as a shortfall in taxes (no form of reciprocal financing was 
decided) or else by means of an increased debt to be borne by future generations. The theme 
                                        
50   Cf. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge 
(Mass.), 1965. 
51   Cf. N. Petersen, Demokratie und Grundgesetz — Veränderungen des Demokratieprinzips in Art. 20 Abs. 
2 GG angesichts der Herausforderungen moderner Staatlichkeit, JöR 58 (2010), pp. 137 ff. 
52   In the literature on Public Choice, this phenomenon is called log rolling. An impressive current example 
from the U.S. Senate may be consulted on http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/284890-1 at 150:59 (= 
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was hotly debated in the media, because the government party that had pushed this reduction 
through had been given substantial donations by hoteliers; otherwise, the reduction would 
never have been noticed, on account of the rational ignorance of the electorate. 
Public Choice Theory explains here what already makes sense to us from our own life expe-
rience. However, at the same time it provides us with a theoretical framework, with the help 
of which we can make predictions not just from anecdotal experience, but from models. 
2.  The efficiency of representation 
Another important aspect of our issue is the uneven distribution of information (information 
asymmetry) between voters and politicians. However, it is possible for economics to have 
solution concepts ready. Such problems are generally dealt with by the principal-agent theo-
ry, which is rationally and theoretically founded and pertains to the field of microeconomics: 
in the models, the “agent” performs a task at the behest of the “principal”, from which the 
principal profits; the agent receives a contractually defined “reward” from the principal. Be-
sides the classic working relation, such “contracts” may describe any kind of service, and 
they may also be applied to the relation between voters and politicians.
53 For the problems of 
adverse selection,
54 as described here, it has developed solution models that may be translat-
ed to the political reality.  
If we look at the parliamentarian’s mandate as an application for information asymmetries in 
a principal-agent relation, then the problem for the voter lies especially in the fact that a par-
liamentarian’s performance is hard to assess in advance.
55 One possibility would be for the 
candidate to display his qualification by means of a credible signal: this would facilitate the 
well-informed contract party (i.e., the parliamentarian) to overcome the information asym-
metry in the elections.
56 What is more interesting from the point-of-view of contract theory, 
however, is the opposite constellation, in which it is not the agent who signals a qualification, 
but the principal who compels the agent (the parliamentarian) — through cunning contract 
design — to disclose hidden information before the elections (this is referred to as screening). 
                                        
53   In political economics, the relation between citizens and state organs is regarded as being analogous to a 
principal-agent relation. Here, the citizens are seen as principals and the state organs are seen as agents. 
See more details on this in J. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty, 1975. 
54    Cf. A. Nicklisch/N. Petersen, Vertragstheorie, in: Towfigh/Petersen (fn. 38), pp. 121 f. Adverse selection 
describes a mechanism in which there is a downward spiral as a result of information asymmetry be-
tween the principal (e.g., a buyer who is ultimately not capable of reliably determining the quality of a 
product) and the agent (e.g., a seller who knows the product and its quality well): worse and worse goods 
are sold at ever lower prices, because the averaged price (= the weighted average of the relation between 
good and poor products on the market) offered by the buyer, who is burdened with an information risk, is 
only attractive for those buyers whose product is poor, i.e., worth less than the average price. Those who 
have good products stay away from the market, which is why we speak of a market mechanism leads to 
an adverse selection. 
55   Cf. G. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemmons”. Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, QJE 84 
(1970), pp. 488 ff. 
56   Accession to a party might well be such a signal, cf. J. Snyder & M. Ting, An Informational Rationale for 
Political Parties, AJPS 46 (2002), pp. 90 ff. 18 
Problems can also occur after elections, however, for instance if parliamentarians cannot be 
properly observed in the performance of their actions. Certain political goals not being 
achieved may be due to a coalition partner, the poor economy or even a substantial donation 
to the party or the influence of lobbyists. Such “post-contractual” uncertainty is termed moral 
hazard by economists: the agent may be contractually obliged to make an appropriate effort, 
but frequently has interests that are in opposition to this: the principal wishes to see the high-
est possible effort level for his money, and the agent has incentives to obtain this money with 
minimal effort. The approaches that economic contract theory has prepared for this occasion 
do not lead to an efficient solution, but only to the best possible answer to information 
asymmetry (the so-called second-best solution).  
At this point, I must make do with these outlines. In order to conduct a serious analysis, the 
individual factors that are relevant for our context would have to be sought out (possibly em-
pirically) and then formalized so that we could introduce them into the theoretical world of 
the model. Only a precise formalization allows one to draw clear theoretical conclusions, 
which in turn would require empirical examination. Applying the theoretical approaches we 
have dealt with to the question of representation, however, seems a promising approach. On 
the one hand, such an application shows that politicians may have substantial incentives, in-
dependently of parties, to pursue other interests than those of common welfare; on the other 
hand, it also shows how one can try to gear the interests of the representatives towards the 
interests of the represented. We can also expect to see proof that a number of mechanisms 
that can be deduced from contract theory, for instance, are already firmly established in con-
stitutional theory; they would thus gain a further theoretical justification. 
III.  The existence of a popular will that can be traced back to individual  
preferences 
Finally, New Political Economy shall help us here to show why the reference point of the 
idea of representation — a form of popular will that can be traced back to individual prefer-
ences — seems questionable. This has to do with a fundamental, principal problem of aggre-
gating individual preference orders to a social welfare function, as shown by the Nobel Prize 
winner Kenneth Arrow in his dissertation Social Choice and Individual Values in 1951. He 
asked whether it is possible systematically to find a voting or election process that can be 
universally applied, fulfilling all criteria he deemed necessary for an election — and he 
proved mathematically, by means of his so-called impossibility theorem, that there cannot be 
such a procedure.  
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Arrow postulates four requirements for a voting or election system:  
–  First, the result of an election procedure, i.e., the collective preference order, must be tran-
sitive. In other words, preferences must be arranged such that for three options, a, b and c, 
the following is valid: if a > b and b > c, then it must follow that a > c.  
–  Second, the collective ranking of two options must be independent of irrelevant alterna-
tives.  
–  Third, the collective decision must be based upon the preferences of the group members, 
i.e., if all voters prefer one option to another, this should reflect in the collective decision 
(Pareto criterion). 
–  Fourth, there must be no dictator, i.e., no individual whose preferences automatically de-
termine the collective decision.  
On the basis of these four assumptions, Arrow has shown that it is always possible, with three 
or more options at the disposal of two or more voters, to detect or shape a preference order 
that makes it impossible to find a consistent collective decision. Every possibly election pro-
cedure either breaches one of the four criteria or is not universally applicable.
57  
Arrow’s proof ultimately means that, for reasons of principle, there can be no popular will 
that can rationally be attributed to an aggregation of individual preferences. A pragmatic ob-
jection, namely that we rarely vote on more than three options and that the impossibility theo-
rem hence takes effect only in exceptional cases,
58 is futile because it disregards the complex-
ity of political decisions and their contextuality. For popular will, which the traditional repre-
sentation principle takes as a frame of reference, is not the will that is formed in a single 
election — say, between two options available for a healthcare reform. Such elections, in-
tended to be plebiscitary, do not exist in practice. Further, even the linking of such elections 
                                        
57   Scores of mathematicians and economists attempt to sidestep this implacable insight by developing mod-
els that try to soften individual criteria — so far, without much success. For the dictator and the Pareto 
criterion, a modification is not up for discussion. With transitivity, compromises might indeed be reached 
— perhaps it suffices merely to determine the winner of an election —, but further developments of Ar-
row’s theorem have shown that there are significant difficulties even then. Whether the criterion of inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives should be softened or given up altogether is indeed being discussed; 
however, what are still lacking are good reasons that may rationalize an election procedure that contra-
venes this criterion. With regard to the criterion of universality, there is hope: much research is being 
conducted to develop models offering – for certain situations – procedures that could avoid our problems. 
For the political theory discourse, a set of alternative models seems interesting that does not presuppose 
completely arbitrary preference orders of voters but well-ordered political conflicts. — On this, see also 
the synopsis in A. Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, Nobel Lecture, American Economic Review 89 
(1999), pp. 349 ff. 
  Moreover, for the sake of completeness, it shall be noted that the Downsian median voter theorem de-
scribed above may be considered one solution to the Arrow theorem: If an aggregation of preferences at 
the median is successful, this preference order meets all criteria postulated by Arrow. However, the 
Downsian model assumptions (cf. fn. 43), especially the one-dimensional policy space and the single-
peaked preferences of voters, may hardly be met in reality. 
58   Hartmann, Eigeninteresse (fn. 41), p. 22. 20 
would lead to the problems described by Arrow. But even a single voting decision, for in-
stance Bundestag elections, can mean that the voter decides on a string of political choices, 
using his first vote and his second vote (Erst- und Zweitstimme). The problem becomes par-
ticularly salient when we look at popular will in the context of the Federal budget: how 
should tax revenues be used, and how should expenditures on social, educational or military 
issues be prioritized and weighted? A popular will that can in some way be rationally traced 
back to citizens’ preferences cannot be formed. And if it cannot be formed, popular will can-
not be represented. Interestingly, this is not only the case of popular will, but for any form of 
collective will, so it is just valid for “party will” and for the representation of the “party peo-
ple” in the democratically constituted organs of the party. This means we can no longer even 
claim that a party represents a particular section of the people. 
Representation can then no longer be understood as mirroring the people, but only in the 
sense of delegation — parliamentarians do not make decisions according to the will of the 
people, but instead of the people. 
D. Consequences 
What consequences can we draw from our reflections on the representation principle in light 
of New Political Economy? On the whole, there is a discrepancy between normative stand-
ards and the political reality, which only fosters doubts about the implementation of the nor-
mative conception of the Grundgesetz. First of all, it has become evident that the idea of rep-
resentation cannot refer to the people’s will; if we wish to stick to it, we would need to speci-
fy what it refers to and how it ought to be designed. Secondly, it has become clear that 
parliamentarians have significant incentives, even without parties, to pursue particular inter-
ests, and that these incentives become even more prominent in the party state. The fact that 
parliamentarians and parties — in addition to parliamentarians in their allegiance to their par-
ties — follow these incentives seems plausible and is widely acknowledged; just how large 
these effects are in the political reality would have to be empirically examined. At any rate, a 
representative concept of democracy cannot realistically refer to the representation of the en-
tire people. Nor can an individual parliamentarian, a party or the entire parliamentary system 
be understood as representing the entire people.  
The three scholars of constitutional theory, whom I have discussed here ‘representatively’ (?), 
and perhaps somewhat pointedly made the archetypal protagonists in the dispute on represen-
tation — Leibholz, Hesse and Stolleis — followed the three paths that seem to me to be pos-
sible solutions to the problem of representation. For Hesse, the concept of representation 
plays no major role, and one might even say, albeit exaggerating slightly, that he gave up on 
it. If there is no convincing concept of representation to be found, this will have to be the 
consequence. For Leibholz and Stolleis, the concept of representation plays an important part, 
namely one that legitimizes the democratic state. The idea of a voluntative linking of the state 21 
to the people it is destined to serve is highly captivating. These two scholars hence follow a 
different path. Leibholz gives up the idea of representation, only to replace it with a new legit-
imation idea — identity — that makes the will of the people pivotal to democratic power. 
Finally, for lack of a sustainable alternative concept, Stolleis maintains the idea of representa-
tion, albeit as a fiction, but he wishes to modify the way in which representation is under-
stood, on the one hand, and, on the other, he wishes to ensure by means of institutions that the 
concept of representation can come into effect, i.e., primarily avert disruptions. 
These three possibilities are open to us even today. Leibholz followed one of these paths until 
the end, with a concrete alternative; he was unable to find a sustainable solution. Modern 
constitutional theory must continue to search for it. 